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THE SUFFOCATION OF FREE SPEECH DUE TO THE 
"GRAVITY OF DANGER" OF TERRORISM 
By Tim Davis* 
Ii al-Timimi ("al-Timimi"), a well respected, outspoken 
Muslim scholar, in his fervent support of Muslims eve-
rywhere, has openly proclaimed that America is one of 
the chief enemies of the Muslim populace. 1 He proclaimed that 
the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia was a sign for Mus-
lims to take action.2 He urged young Muslim men to jihad, to 
wage armed conflict with the enemies oflslam.3 
In 2004, the Federal government charged al-Timimi in a ten-
count indictment.4 During his trial in April 2005, the prosecution 
introduced over 250 evidentiary exhibits,5 along with testimony 
from expert witnesses on radical Islamism6 and testimony from 
various government agents. In addition, the prosecution intro-
duced testimony from several co-conspirators convicted in an 
earlier trial.7 The co-conspirators were facing harsh sentences 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unless they cooperated 
with the government.8 
Despite this mountain of evidence, probative evidence that 
al-Timimi was actually involved in any illegal activity is quite 
limited. In fact, the pivotal evidence against al-Timimi centers 
on the corroborated testimony of co-conspirators testifying that 
al-Timimi was present at a two-hour meeting at a co-
conspirator' s home on September 16, 2001, five days after the 
tragedy of 9/11.9 The testimony alleged that al-Timimi incited 
the attendees to take up jihad along with the Taliban, even in the 
likely event that the jihadists would engage in direct action with 
American forces in Afghanistan. 10 
On April 18, 2005, jury deliberations began, and buried in 
nearly 200 pages of jury instructions, was a single paragraph that 
unceremoniously described the law of protected speech under 
Brandenburg v. Ohio. 11 After deliberating for seven days, the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty on all ten counts. 12 Subse-
quently, al-Timimi was sentenced to life in prison plus 70 
years. 13 
The trial of United States of America v. Ali Al-Timimi14 
raises a number of First Amendment issues. First, this Article 
lays a foundation describing the facts of the Al-Timimi case and 
the prior co-conspirator trial, United States v. Khan. 15 Next, the 
Article explores the application of the First Amendment and dis-
cusses relevant cases, including United States v. Rahman, 16 a 
case remarkably similar to Al-Timimi. 
From this analysis, it is clear that courts have had difficulty 
defining the line between protected advocacy and criminal 
speech, including whether or how Brandenburg v. Ohio should 
be applied. Moreover, in deciding between what constitutes ad-
vocacy and criminal speech, the courts have leaned towards 
criminal speech when the solicited activity is sufficiently grave, 
especially in the context of national security. Repeatedly, the 
courts have demonstrated that there is an inverse relationship 
between gravity of danger and freedom of speech; when the cir-
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cumstances are sufficiently grave, free speech will be less toler-
ated. 
Regardless of whether terrorism represents one of the grav-
est dangers this country has ever faced, it has led the government 
to scale back fundamental constitutional rights with the enact-
ment of the Patriot Act. Reminiscent of the prosecutions of al-
leged Communists amidst the hysteria of McCarthyism, the gov-
ernment has brought down swift and furious punishment upon 
anyone even remotely connected to terrorism. In the final analy-
sis, I assert that al-Timimi's two speeches in September and Oc-
tober of2001 should be considered protected speech, resulting in 
the United States government having insufficient proof to sustain 
the conviction. If al-Timimi were to lose his appeal, the funda-
mental constitutional right of free speech would be significantly 
diminished. 38 
Al-Timimi was born in 1963 in Washington, D.C. to Muslim 
parents who worked in the Iraqi Embassy. 17 In 1978, his parents 
moved to Saudi Arabia where he received instruction in the 
Qur'an. From an early age, he was intrigued by the depiction of 
Judgement Day in the Qur'an and started a lifelong inquiry of the 
harbingers and omens of the approach of a foretold apocalypse. 
At age 17, al-Timimi returned to a changed United States to 
attend college, where he perceived a growing intolerance of 
Muslims in the United States, which fueled his devotion to the 
study oflslam. In 1987, while thousands of Muslims were pour-
ing into Afghanistan to join the mujahideen, 18 he traveled to Me-
dina, Saudi Arabia, to study at the college of Haddith. After his 
return from Medina, al-Timimi started lecturing on various top-
ics of Islam and became a well-respected lecturer in the global 
Muslim community. He lectured at various conferences, particu-
larly at those hosted by the Islamic Assembly of North America 
("JANA"). He co-founded the Dar al-Arqam Center ("Center") 
to provide English language instruction on Islam, and became a 
frequent and popular speaker there. 19 In the aftermath of 9/11, 
the FBI investigated organizations whose purpose was to incite 
violent jihad and to recruit jihadists. 20 The Northern Virginia 
investigations culminated in the arrest, trial, and conviction of al-
Timimi for advocating criminal activity. 
On February 9, 2004, the government opened its case 
against the "Virginiajihadnetwork"21 in United States v. Khan. 22 
The network was charged with numerous, serious federal crimes 
including conspiracy to contribute services to the Taliban and 
other terrorist organizations, conspiracy to levy war against the 
United States, and violation of the Neutrality Act.23 The 11 de-
fendants, including Masoud Ahmad Khan, Yong Ki Kwon, and 
Muhammed Aatique, were regular attendees at the Center in 
Falls Church, Virginia.24 
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In early January 2000, Kwon and Nabil Gharbieh, a Center 
co-founder, decided that in order to prepare for jihad, they 
would conduct military training by playing paintball.25 Eventu-
ally all of the defendants played paintball with the express pur-
pose of training for jihad.26 Several defendants acquired weap-
ons such as AK-47s and sniper rifles along with other less exotic 
27 weapons. Three of the defendants had traveled to Pakistan to 
obtain military training at a camp run by Laskar-e-Taiba 
("LET"),28 an organization dedicated to violent jihad defending 
the rights of Muslims in the disputed Kashmir region of India 
and Pakistan. The United States designated LET as a foreign 
terrorism organization ("FTO") in December of2001.29 
Two days after 9/11, al-Timimi asked Kwon "to organize a 
plan in case of anti-Muslim backlash and to get the brothers to-
gether."30 Kwon and another defendant, Royer, made all of the 
phone calls and set up the meeting for Sunday September 16, 
2001 at Kwon's home.31 At the meeting, it is alleged that al-
Timimi incited the group for violent jihad in support of the Tali-
ban. In the next few days, four of the meeting attendees, Kwon, 
Khan, Hasan, and Aatique, flew to Pakistan with the intention to 
attend the LET camps.32 Khan arranged his flight so he could 
accompany Aatique on September 19, 2001, since Aatique al-
ready had a reservation on a flight to Pakistan for that day.33 
At another meeting in early October, 2001, al-Timimi alleg-
edly exhorted five other members of the paintball group to take 
up jihad in support of the Taliban.34 Within days of the second 
meeting, one defendant left for the LET camps in Pakistan and 
another simply left the country.35 The LET camp trainees took 
part in various weapons training including automatic weapons, 
grenades, RPGs, and anti-aircraft guns.36 However, after the 
start of open hostilities against the Taliban on October 20 2001 
the Pakistanis closed their border with Afghanistan.37 ~ addi~ 
tion, the Pakistani government was actively evicting foreign 
fighters from the camps.38 Consequently, the defendants still at 
the camps, Khan, Hasan, and Kwon, learned that LET would no 
longer facilitate their travel to Afghanistan.39 Instead, Khan and 
Hasan returned to the United States and Kwon remained in Paki-
stan to start a mango export business.40 
Six of the defendants agreed to plea bargain deals before 
trial requiring that they cooperate with the government and tes-
tify against the other co-defendants. Of the five remaining de-
fendants that stood trial, all but one of them were found guilty.41 
In a separate trial, another alleged coconspirator, Sabri Benk-
hala, was acquitted of all charges.42 
In April 2005, al-Timimi was charged with inciting and/or 
aiding and abetting the "network" to commit their crimes.43 The 
government's primary contention was that al-Timimi, through 
his lectures and direct personal appeals, induced and/or aided 
and abetted members of the Virginia jihad network to leave the 
country and pursue jihad training with the intent to defend the 
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Taliban against all potential enemies, including the United 
S 44 tates. A key element of the prosecution's case was that al-
Timimi was the ringleader of the Virginia jihad network. 
Al-Timimi was described as a well respected lecturer at the 
Center, whom many attendees asked for advice on a wide vari-
ety of Islamic matters, including minor, almost trivial matters 
such as whether one can pray in a moving car or whether one 
may shorten prayers upon the discovery of a scorpion.45 On 
several occasions the paintball group asked al-Timimi's advice 
on the matters pertaining to paintball. Through an intermediary, 
Kwon asked al-Timimi what he thought of the paintball, to 
which al-Timimi said, "That is something good that the brothers 
can do."46 In September 2000, FBI agents questioned one de-
fendant about his paintball activities.47 The defendant related 
that al-Timimi said to continue playing paintball, because stop-
ping will look more suspicious, but to be more discrete in the 
future. 48 Soon afterward, the paintball group discontinued play-
ing at local public courses and moved their activities to a private 
farmland in Spotsylvania County.49 
On September 11, 2001, al-Timimi was supposed to attend 
d. d . 50 a mner an give a lecture. However, when the group met for 
dinner, they cancelled the lecture in light of the tragic events of 
that day. The government contended that at the dinner al-
Timimi expressed his approval of the attacks and sought justifi-
cation for the attacks.51 In the Khan trial, two witnesses testified 
that al-Timimi said the attacks were not Islamically justifiable, 
but that United States' foreign policy had precipitated the at-
tacks.52 The government's one witness to the contrary Hasan 
was discredited in cross-examination with his inconsiste~t gran~ 
jury testimony.53 
Two days after 9/11, al-Timimi asked Kwon "to organize a 
plan in case of anti-Muslim backlash and to get the brothers to-
gether."54 On September 16, 2001, al-Timimi attended the 
meeting at Kwon's home.55 When al-Timimi arrived he told the 
group to turn off their phones, unplug the answering machine, 
and pull down the curtains.56 Al-Timimi then told them that this 
meeting was amana, trust, which meant that the attendees were 
not to talk about the meeting.57 During the trial, the government 
wanted to introduce evidence that at this meeting al-Timimi dis-
cussed Afghanistan because Mullah Omar, the leader of the 
Taliban, had called for Muslims from all parts of the world to 
defend the Taliban against imminent attack.58 The defense 
counsel successfully blocked the government from introducing 
th t 'd 59 E h a ev1 ence. ven t ough the government could not allege 
that al-Timimi was attempting to recruit jihad fighters for the 
Taliban, other evidence supports a conclusion that Afghanistan 
was a topic of discussion by the group that night.60 
Later, at the same meeting, al-Timimi read parts of the al-
Uqla fatwa opinion to the group and gave the fatwa to Khan 
with the instructions to burn it after he had read it. 61 (Al-Timimi 
told the group that they must join the mujahideen and that it did 
not matter who they fought, Indians, Russians, or Americans.)62 
Al-Timimi said that the duty to take up jihad is Jard ayn, obliga-
tory to all Muslims.63 Al-Timimi offered the group several 
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choices: (1) to take up jihad and defend the Muslims in Afghani-
stan; (2) to go and make hijra, leave the United States to avoid 
supporting the government by paying taxes; or (3) to lay like a 
rug in your house.64 Three days later, on September 19, Aatique 
and Khan flew to Pakistan and eventually made their way to the 
LET camps for military training. 65 The next day, Kwon and 
Hasan followed suit.66 
One month later, in early to mid-October, another meeting 
was convened.67 Al-Timimi told this group the same informa-
tion he told the group on September 16.68 In response, one de-
fendant immediately quit his job, 
flew to Pakistan, and proceeded 
to the LET camp to receive jihad 
training.69 Another defendant, 
who had a family and did not 
wish to fight, simply left the 
country (hijra). 70 
Additionally, at trial the 
government introduced numer-
ous speeches given by al-
Timimi. One of the most controversial speeches introduced was 
the "Space Shuttle" speech, delivered shortly after the space 
shuttle Columbia exploded upon reentry into the earth's atmos-
phere on February I, 2003. 71 In it, al-Timimi proclaimed that 
"[t]here is no doubt that Muslims were overjoyed because of the 
adversity that befell their greatest enemy."72 Always interested 
in omens, al-Timimi then described the numerous omens evoked 
by space shuttle explosion that foretold the impending doom of 
the United States.73 In another speech entitled World Advice to 
the Salajis, al-Timimi said, "wagingjihad in the path of Allah is 
an unceasing obligatory duty until the Day of Judgment, not to 
be forsaken because of the lack of a khalifa."74 
A 0 P ICAB E LAW (;:QVE °'lt,,8 A •VOC:AC:v Ci 
I L CA Ac-1v 1v 
Initially, it is worth noting that cases concerning advocacy 
of illegal activity are relatively rare. Consequently, advocacy of 
illegal activity cases appear for a time and then disappear for 
many years, paralleling the wax and wane of the political move-
ments that give rise to the activity. The first political movement 
that advocated illegal activity was the Socialist movement in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by the 
Communist movement after World War II. Today, we are po-
tentially engaged in the third act of advocacy cases, those con-
cerning Islamic activism. 
The first advocacy cases were almost exclusively confined 
to the prosecution of members of the socialist party in and 
around the First World War.75 Most, if not all of the activities 
for which Socialists were prosecuted at that time, would be per-
missible today.76 
Ironically, our discussion of al-Timimi starts with Schenck 
v. United States.77 While al-Timimi was convicted of speech 
that incited young Muslim men to participate in armed con-
tlict,78 Schenck was convicted of pamphleteering to dissuade 
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young men from enlisting in the armed services during World 
War 1.79 In Schenck, the Court refused to apply First Amend-
ment protection to Schenck's speech, stating that, "the character 
of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done" 
and on the "proximity and degree."80 Accordingly, the court set 
down the "clear and present danger" test that would endure for 
almost 40 years. Advocacy of illegal activity would be pro-
tected unless the "words used are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 
a right to prevent."81 The time 
frame for the actual danger in 
Schenck, that someone would read 
the pamphlet and decide not to 
enlist, was anywhere from immi-
nent to several months or years. 
This rule effectively gave the gov-
ernment broad discretion to prose-
cute speculatively dangerous 
speech. 
After advocacy of illegal action speech had laid dormant for 
30 years, four important cases arose from the Communist era in 
the United States: Dennis v. United States, 82 Yates v. United 
States, 83 Scales v. United States, 84 and Noto v. United States. 85 
These cases mark the first time the Supreme Court was willing 
to give advocacy of illegal acts First Amendment protection, 
reversing the holdings in the Socialist cases. The Supreme 
Court defined numerous examples of protected and non-
protected activity in these cases, including requisite evidence. 
Decided during the heyday of McCarthyism, the Court in 
Dennis upheld the convictions against all of the defendants for 
violations of the Smith Act.86 The Court was concerned that the 
Communists would use the freedom of speech to destroy liberty. 
Thus, with this fear in mind, the Supreme Court sidestepped the 
"clear and present danger" test and adopted the test advanced by 
Chief Judge Learned Hand who wrote for the lower court.87 
Judge Hand wrote, "in each case [courts] must ask whether the 
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies 
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger."88 Once the court concluded that the danger was sufficient, 
the invasion of free speech was permissible.89 
Yates was decided in 1957, several years after public sup-
port for Senator Joseph McCarthy had withered, thus allowing 
the Court to decide an advocacy case without the threat of a 
public backlash fueled by hysteria. In Yates, the court empha-
sized the distinction between "advocacy in the realm of ideas" 
and the "advocacy of action."90 "The essential distinction is that 
the advocate must be urging his or her audience to do some-
thing, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in 
something."91 Therefore, abstract advocacy divorced from ac-
tion would not be punished,92 while advocacy meant to instigate 
action, coupled with evil intent, was punishable.93 Similarly, 
Scales and Noto were decided on the same day in 1960 and 
stand for the same proposition; mere membership alone in an 
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organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment cannot be prosecuted.94 However, "active" participation, 
unlike "nominal" membership, could be punished.95 
In 1969, the Court decided Brandenburg, now the seminal 
case for advocacy of illegal activity. Although the opinion ad-
dressed many of the loose ends left dangling from the Commu-
nist party advocacy cases, Brandenburg's holding and applica-
tion is still hotly debated today. If nothing else, Brandenburg 
finally overruled the "clear and present danger" test. In Bran-
denburg, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group was convicted of 
advocating unlawful action during two separate rallies where he 
exhorted attendees to commit violence.96 In striking down 
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act, the Court declared: 
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law vio-
lation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action.97 
In the wake of Brandenburg, the line between mere advo-
cacy and advocacy to action is not always clear. Rather than 
struggle over this distinction, some courts merely declare that 
the speech concerned is not advocacy and therefore is not pro-
tected.98 However, a common thread does run through all of 
these advocacy cases: the more the speech moves away from the 
ethereal world of ideas toward the concrete world of action, the 
more likely the speech is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. An 
equally important corollary is the 
more imminent or apparent the dan-
ger is, the less likely the speech that 
instigated the danger is protected. 
Consistent with this proposition, it is 
worth noting that Brandenburg did 
not explicitly overrule Dennis or Yates and courts are free to 
weigh the "gravity" of the danger to facilitate the desired out-
come.99 Adding to this confusion is the fact that there have been 
various interpretations of what "imminent" means. 
The seminal case on the interpretation of Brandenburg's 
"imminent" requirement is Hess v. lndiana. 100 In Hess, the de-
fendant was participating in an antiwar demonstration on the 
campus of Indiana University. 101 In an effort to retain some 
control over the demonstration, police officers moved the dem-
onstrators off the street onto the sidewalks. 102 It was then that 
the defendant uttered, "We'll take the fucking streets later." 103 
He was promptly arrested for disorderly conduct. 104 The Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction holding that "the statement 
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at 
some indefinite future time."105 Here, the Court clarified the 
Brandenburg test by stipulating that "imminent" means "now" 
or "immediately." Most courts adhere to the Hess Court's nar-
row interpretation of the Brandenburg test, 106 though in People 
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v. Rubin,1°7 the court held that five weeks constituted imminent 
danger. 108 
Additionally, as a practical matter, the more specific the 
speech, the more likely the speech is unprotected. In Branden-
burg, Brandenburg said, "Bury the [blacks]."109 Yet, suppose 
Brandenburg had said, "See that black man over there, go bury 
him!" In that instance, the speech is advocacy to action and is 
very close to incitement or solicitation of murder. Though one 
might think that the "imminency" requirement of Brandenburg 
would limit the speaker's criminal liability, the specificity of the 
incitement permits the courts to label the speech "non-
advocacy" and ignore Brandenburg altogether. At this point, 
the courts turn to evidence of the intent of the speaker and weigh 
the gravity of the "advocacy to action." 
Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman was tried and convicted 
for seditious conspiracy, conspiracy and solicitation to the mur-
der of Egyptian President Mubarak, soliciting an attack on 
American military installations, and bombing conspiracy. 110 
Rahman, otherwise known as the "blind sheik," was indeed 
blind and could only participate in those acts through speech. 
The government contended that Rahman generally remained at a 
level above the details of the individual operations, or in other 
words, he was the ringleader. 111 In Rahman, the government 
introduced speeches previously delivered by the defendant 
where he instructed his followers to "do jihad with the sword, 
with the cannon, with grenades, with the missile ... against 
God's enemies."112 The crucial 
evidence proffered by the govern-
ment was a number of Rahman's 
conversations taped by law enforce-
ment agencies. 113 
The Rahman case is quite similar 
to the al-Timimi case in that in each 
case, a Muslim cleric or scholar was 
prosecuted for soliciting, counseling, aiding, and abetting acts of 
terrorism. Each of the men were adherents to a fundamental 
strain of Islam that not only advocated jihad, but believed that 
jihad was obligatory .114 In each case, the government intro-
duced the defendant's public speeches to demonstrate motive. 
However, the similarities end there. Rahman had attained the 
level of Grand Mufti, able to render fatwa opinions; al-Timimi 
had not. Rahman authorized all of his directives by issuing the 
requisite fatawa, 115 whereas al-Timimi had to rely on other Mus-
lim scholars for religious rulings. Rahman was in constant com-
munication with his co-conspirators, giving them direction at 
every turn. 116 Al-Timimi was a distant observer of the Khan 
defendants and hardly knew them. 117 Rahman had an agenda of 
terrorism, 118 in contrast to al-Timimi who was simply giving 
guidance to his followers. Despite these differences, the govern-
ment used the Rahman trial as a template to prosecute al-
Timimi. 
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There are a number of factors present in the Al-Timimi case 
that tend to move al-Timimi' s speech toward the protected 
sphere of Brandenburg. 
The allegation that al-Timimi was the Virginia jihad net-
work ringleader was a crucial part of the government's case vis-
a-vis the First Amendment. Yet, just as the defendant in Bran-
denburg disassociated from the attendees at the KKK rally, al-
Timimi advocated at a distance from his co-defendants. 
No evidence exists that al-Timimi was the Virginia jihad 
network ringleader. The prosecutor elicited testimony from the 
Khan defendants that al-Timimi was well respected and an-
swered many of their questions concerning Islam. However, al-
Timimi was not a Grand Mufti and he had to rely on other more 
established Muslim scholars for their fatawa. Al-Timimi merely 
relayed these fatawa to all members of the Center. In fact, the 
government pointed out the fact that al-Timimi brought the al-
Uqla fatwa to the September 16 meeting at Kwon's house. 119 
Testimony was introduced that al-Timimi gave the written fatwa 
to Masoud Khan with the instructions to burn it after reading 
it. 120 Rather than supporting the prosecution's allegations that 
al-Timimi was a ringleader, this incident demonstrates that al-
Timimi was obligated to follow the Islamic rulings of other cler-
ics. Instead of being a ringleader, al-Timimi was a low-ranking 
Muslim scholar who acted as a messenger between other muftis 
and the Muslims at the Center. 
The is little doubt that al-Timimi gave the Khan defendants 
a wide variety of advice on Islamic matters. Moreover, there is 
no reason to doubt the testimony of Kwon and Hasan, both of 
whom corroborated the fact that al-Timimi gave them informa-
tion specifically intended to facilitate their criminal objective -
travel to Pakistan. The problem is that everything al-Timimi 
said to them was information that anybody could have given 
them. 121 Additionally, aiding and abetting can take the form of 
"steeling [one] to such action," 122 and a case can be made that 
al-Timimi did in fact steel some of the Khan defendants to ac-
tion. After the September 16 meeting, Kwon and Hasan imme-
diately purchased airline tickets to travel to Pakistan on Septem-
ber 20. 123 Al-Timimi met with Kwon and Hasan on September 
19 for lunch. 124 It is alleged that al-Timimi discussed their plans 
and gave them more advice. 125 Admittedly, this meeting 
smacks of"steeling [a group] to such action." However, rarely 
in this country's history has a defendant been prosecuted for 
merely steeling one to an action that they have already decided 
to do. 
Solicitation can only happen before the recipient-doer has 
formed the intent to commit the crime. 126 This is especially im-
portant for al-Timimi's case because if the Khan defendants 
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formed the intent to travel to the LET camps prior to the Sep-
tember 16 meeting, then al-Timimi cannot be legally prosecuted 
for incitement, which is criminalized as solicitation. There are 
several factors that could support this conclusion: several of the 
Khan defendants had already traveled to the LET camps and 
there has been no assertion that they were prompted by al-
Timimi; the hostile reaction to the Muslim community after 
9/11; 127 and the fact that several of the Khan defendants had 
already purchased cold weather camouflage jackets from Ca-
bela's before the September 16 meeting. 128 If so, then al-
Timimi's speech merely added to their resolve, it did not pre-
cipitate it. 
While al-Timimi is undoubtedly a devout adherent to his 
faith who fully expected that his advice be followed, al-Timimi 
had no personal stake in the Khan defendants' endeavors to take 
up jihad. Furthermore, al-Timimi rarely provided specific de-
tails about the manner in which someone might follow his ad-
vice. While Rahman exhorted specific acts from his followers, 
such as executing Egyptiona President Mubarak and bombing 
the United Nations building, 129 al-Timimi in a more general 
way, advised the Khan defendants to take up the defense of 
Muslims, regardless of who was oppressor. 130 
If the Khan defendants did indeed form the intent to take 
jihad before the September 16 meeting, then al-Timimi could be 
convicted based on "steeling"131 them to action at the meeting 
itself. However, al-Timimi did not engage in any instructional 
speech that could constitute overt physical acts of aiding and 
abetting the Khan defendants. Furthermore, as stated earlier, 
there is scant authority for the proposition that someone can be 
punished solely on the basis of"steeling" speech. 
Imminent lawless action under Brandenburg evolved with 
the realization that anyone can be incited to lawless action in the 
heat of the moment. While it may be conceded that al-Timimi 
did in fact exert significant influence over the Khan defendants, 
in a two-hour meeting, al-Timimi likely did not exert sufficient 
influence over these men to have them abandon their lives here 
in the United States, travel to foreign lands, wait for several 
weeks in a foreign land, obtain military training for another sev-
eral weeks, and then potentially sacrifice their lives waging ji-
had. Kwon testified that he and Hasan spent the first two weeks 
in Pakistan at Hasan's uncle's house where they passed the time 
by shopping and taking in the sights. 132 Clearly their actions 
were far from imminent. 
When the United States began to zealously prosecute terror-
ists after 9/11, instead of success, the government encountered 
numerous problems prosecuting terrorists. Against this back-
drop, the trials of Khan and Al-Timimi unfolded. Emboldened 
by its success in the Khan trial, the government went after the 
Khan defendant's spiritual leader, al-Timimi. With their full 
might, the FBI and the Department of Justice rapidly descended 
7 
upon al-Timimi. The lead prosecutor used every opportunity to 
portray al-Timimi as a religious zealot with links to terrorism 
who ordered his mindless devotees to take up jihad against 
United States soldiers. 
The facts speak for themselves. Al-Timimi was not the 
Virginia jihad network ringleader, but rather a revered Muslim 
scholar at the Center, who counseled on Islamic matters. Before 
9/11, the Khan defendants readied themselves for jihad by play-
ing paintball, while two of the Khan defendants bolstered their 
skills by traveling to Pakistan and training with live weapons at 
terrorist camps. These men may have gotten the idea of jihad 
from al-Timimi, but they decided to prepare for jihad on their 
own. After 9/11, the Khan defendants were primed and ready. 
At the September 16, 200 I, meeting, had al-Timimi stated that 
This was a close case. The jury deliberated for seven days, 
but there was little chance they would be able to comprehend 
and apply Brandenburg correctly, given the hot debate among 
learned legal scholars. Yet, there are a number of factors that 
should have categorized al-Timimi's speech as protected under 
Brandenburg. Al-Timimi usually spoke in generalities, he gave 
the Khan defendants choices regarding jihad, and he merely 
answered questions about Islamic permissibility. Al-Timimi 
advocated ideas based on his religious beliefs, regardless of 
whether his speech was likely to prompt action. Furthermore, 
each of the Khan defendants waited weeks before they actually 
participated in terrorist camp training, indicating the lack of im-
minence. Yet, these vital facts to this case become negligible if 
the courts simply declare that al-Timimi's speeches are not ad-
wagingjihadwas not Islamically permissible, likely none of the vocacy and therefore Brandenburg does not apply. There is 
Khan defendants would have proceeded. Yet, the tenor of al-
Timimi' s speeches on jihad was consistent: he believed that 
jihad was fard ayn. That message did not suddenly change after 
9/11. Furthermore, it was al-Timimi's position that the Qur'an 
made no exceptions for the United States. 
* Tim Davis is a third-year law student at American University, Washington 
College of Law. He earned a B.S. in Electrial Engineering from the University 
of Maryland. 
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